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Abstract
It is often argued that capital should ﬂow from aging industrialized
economies to countries with fast-growing populations. However, in-
stitutional failures and the risk of expropriation substantially reduce
developing economies’ attractiveness for foreign investors. We analyze
the inﬂuence of a country’s demographic structure on international in-
vestment, using a political-economy model in which population growth
potentially aﬀects the risk of expropriation. We ﬁrst explore how re-
distributive expropriation aﬀects the welfare of diﬀerent age groups
and derive the government’s incentive to expropriate. We then ana-
lyze how the relative size of diﬀerent generations inﬂuences the feasible
volume of foreign investment.
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It is often argued that declining birth rates and the resulting increase in
capital-labor ratios will eventually cause a sharp drop of the return on cap-
ital in industrialized countries. However, the fact that countries diﬀer con-
siderably with respect to their demographic structure and evolution suggests
that directing capital ﬂows to economies with higher population growth rates
could prevent such a looming“asset price meltdown”.1 As Figure 1 illustrates,
the projected evolution of old-age dependency ratios in diﬀerent world regions
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Figure 1: The evolution of old-age dependency ratios in diﬀerent world re-
gions in percent. Source: United Nations (medium variant)
1The “asset meltdown” hypothesis is explored in Poterba (2001), Abel (2001), B¨ utler
and Harms (2001), Geanakoplos et al. (2004). The potential role of international capital
ﬂows is discussed in Reisen (2000), Brooks (2003), IMF (2004), B¨ orsch-Supan et al. (2006).
2The old-age dependency ratio gives the ratio of persons aged above 64 years to the
working-age population (15-64 years).
1However, the high degree of capital mobility that is required to exploit this
potential is rarely given between industrialized economies and countries with
a complementary demographic structure: information asymmetries, corrup-
tion, a weak legal system and the risk of – outright or creeping – expropriation
are factors which limit the ﬂow of capital from (aging) rich to (younger) poor
countries (see Lucas (1990) and Alfaro et al. (2005)). Hence, while high pop-
ulation growth rates could be a driving force for large international capital
ﬂows they are correlated with the very institutional failures that deter foreign
investors. Does this correlation reﬂect a causal eﬀect or does it merely result
from the fact that population growth is related to other factors which are
responsible for an uncertain policy environment? To answer this question
one needs a deeper understanding of the channels through which population
growth aﬀects the security of property rights in developing countries.
In this paper we make a ﬁrst step in this direction by introducing expropri-
ation risk into an overlapping-generations (OLG) model of a small open econ-
omy which captures some salient features of developing countries – namely
low levels of total factor productivity, underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets, and
a high population growth rate. We start by identifying population growth as
a driver of foreign direct investment (FDI) in a world with secure property
rights. We then analyze the behavior of a government which expropriates
foreign investors if such a decision maximizes its political support among the
generations currently alive. Since, by assumption, foreign ﬁrms withdraw
their expertise in the wake of expropriation, thus lowering average labor pro-
ductivity and wages in the host country, a government has to assess the
relative strength and political importance of three eﬀects: a positive transfer
eﬀect which results from redistributing expropriation proceeds among the
host-country population, a negative wage eﬀect which reﬂects the fact that
the drop in average productivity hurts workers, and a positive return eﬀect
which stems from the fact that the withdrawal of foreign expertise results in
a reallocation of labor which raises the returns of domestic capital owners.
Since age cohorts diﬀer both with respect to their factor endowments and
with respect to their time horizon these eﬀects possibly give rise to a distri-
butional conﬂict along demographic lines, with young agents opposing and
old agents supporting expropriation.
We use our model to derive the constrained volume of FDI which must
not be exceeded to prevent the host-country government from expropriat-
ing foreign ﬁrms. We then show that this non-expropriation constraint is
binding unless the productivity advantage of foreign ﬁrms is very large, and
we demonstrate that, in this case, the aggregate capital stock per worker
evolves as in a closed economy although the country has removed all formal
barriers to international investment. Finally, we show that higher popula-
2tion growth raises the volume of foreign investment. Still, the gap between
constrained FDI and the level that could be obtained absent the risk of ex-
propriation remains large, especially in the periods immediately following the
removal of oﬃcial investment barriers. Moreover, the positive eﬀect of the
population growth rate does not materialize if the political regime is not suf-
ﬁciently democratic, i.e. if larger cohorts do not have a greater weight in the
government’s political support function. We conclude that while developing
economies are often characterized by an unfavorable investment climate, the
high population growth rates observed in these countries mitigate expropria-
tion risk rather than reinforcing it. Hence, the key to enhancing North-South
FDI ﬂows lies in strengthening the“wage eﬀect”which positively depends on
foreign ﬁrms’ productivity, and in empowering young workers whose interests
are aligned with those of foreign investors.
Our paper is related to the large literature on the risk of default in inter-
national lending, as surveyed by Eaton and Fernandez (1995) and Sturzeneg-
ger and Zettelmeyer (2006). While our model abstracts from international
loans and exclusively focuses on FDI, its logic is also based on the funda-
mental problem that – absent a supranational enforcement mechanism or
some other commitment device – a host country government has an incen-
tive to infringe on the property rights of foreign investors unless the costs
of expropriation outweigh the beneﬁts. Cole and English (1991) as well as
Thomas and Worrall (1994) explore the risk of expropriation, assuming that
the host country government decides to expropriate if the immediate ben-
eﬁts dominate the costs of a future embargo by foreign investors.3 In this
framework, foreign investments must not exceed a critical threshold, which
is implicitly deﬁned by the government’s indiﬀerence between expropriation
and non-expropriation. While our model does not rely on an embargo threat
to prevent expropriation – and thus avoids the question whether such a threat
is actually credible – we adopt the notion that foreign investments are re-
stricted by a non-expropriation constraint.4 As in Harms (2002), we relate
the risk of expropriation to an inter-generational distributional conﬂict and
show that, for a given volume of capital inﬂows, the gains from expropria-
tion are large if the host country’s initial income level is low. In contrast
to that paper, however, we assume that foreign investors coordinate on the
constrained level of investment. Moreover, we analyze how the volume of
constrained FDI evolves over time and how it is aﬀected by the population
3For a critique of this argument in the context of international borrowing and lending,
see Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989).
4Cole and English (1991) also discuss the possibility that the risk of expropriation can
be reduced by increasing FDI. In that case, larger capital imports make the long-run cost
more likely to outweigh the short-run gain of seizing foreign capital.
3growth rate.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we explore
the eﬀect of population growth on capital accumulation both under autarky
and after the removal of formal investment barriers. Section 3 introduces the
possibility of expropriation, discusses the impact of expropriation on factor
prices and the welfare of diﬀerent generations, and thus describes the fun-
damental forces that aﬀect the government’s decision. Using these insights,
we derive and interpret the feasible volume of international investment in
diﬀerent time periods and explore how this volume reacts to changes in the
host country’s population growth rate. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Model Structure and Assumptions
We consider an economy that is populated by three overlapping generations:
children, young workers and old workers. The number of individuals born
in period t − 1 is Nt. The number of children born in period t is Nt+1,
and the number of old workers in period t is denoted by Nt−1. Children are
economically passive, but they inﬂuence parents’ behavior by aﬀecting their
utility functions. Speciﬁcally, in period t a typical young worker maximizes
the following utility function:
U
y
t = (1 + nt+1)lnc
y
t + β lnc
o
t+1 . (1)
In equation (1), c
y
t represents the agent’s young-age consumption, and
co
t+1 represents his/her consumption in old age. Young-age utility is weighted
by the number of descendants 1 + nt+1 ≡ Nt+1/Nt to account for the fact
that parents care about their children’s welfare. Throughout this paper, we
assume that the population growth rate is constant over time, i.e. nt = n ∀t.
Labor supply is assumed to be exogenous and normalized to one unit
in both young and old age. The wage paid per unit of labor in period t is
denoted by wt. Hence, labor income at time t is given by wt for both young
and old workers. At time t, a young worker chooses consumption c
y
t and
savings st subject to the following constraint:5
c
y
t + st = wt (2)
5Note that this constraint reﬂects the assumption that there is no rivalry in consumption
between young workers and their descendants.
4We assume that there is no formal capital market that allows for borrow-
ing and lending. While this is clearly a restrictive assumption, implying that
savings cannot be negative, we believe that it is not completely unrealistic for
many developing countries where ﬁnancial institutions are rudimentary and
where a large part of the population saves by accumulating tangible assets.
An agent’s savings are costlessly transformed into physical capital which
is then used in production during the following period, yielding a capital
income. Returns to capital in period t + 1 are denoted by rt+1 and the rate
of depreciation is assumed to be one. By assumption, old workers do not
care for their grandchildren and do not leave any bequests. Hence, their
consumption is constrained by
c
o
t+1 = rt+1st + wt+1. (3)







where labor input is given by
Lt = Nt + Nt−1.
The wage paid for each unit of labor on a competitive labor market in
period t is
wt = (1 − α)Atk
α
t (5)
with kt as the capital stock per worker, i.e. kt ≡ Kt/Lt. The return to




Throughout the paper total factor productivity At is assumed to be con-
stant over time, i.e. At = A ∀ t.
2.2 Capital Accumulation in a
Closed Economy
All agents are assumed to have perfect foresight. Given the objective function
(1), the constraints (2) and (3), and a constant population growth rate n,
optimal savings of a young worker are given by
5st =
1
1 + n + β
 





Note that, in the closed economy, the endogenous evolution of factor
prices guarantees that st is non-negative. Using equations (5), (6) and (7) as









α(2 + n)(1 + n + β) + (1 + n)(1 − α)
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Apparently, λ (and thus k) is decreasing in n. Hence, ceteris paribus, a
country with a fast-growing population is characterized by a low per-capita
income. This has two reasons: ﬁrst – as in the neoclassical growth model by
Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) – higher population growth lowers the steady-
state capital intensity for a given savings rate. In addition, a higher number
of children raises young workers’ consumption and lowers their savings rate.
2.3 International Investment with Secure Property
Rights
We now consider the eﬀects of opening up the country under consideration
(the “developing country”) to international investment: starting in period t,
foreign ﬁrms are allowed to set up subsidiaries in the domestic economy and
foreign capital starts to operate in the domestic economy in period t+1. We
continue to assume that there is no borrowing and lending. Hence, all foreign
capital ﬂows arrive in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI).














with the superscript F denoting“foreign”variables in the host country.
6A further – and crucial – assumption is that foreign ﬁrms, along with their
capital, export their expertise, i.e. superior technological and organizational
skills which allow them to use a given amount of capital and labour more ef-
ﬁciently. Hence, we assume that AF > AH with AH denoting the total factor
productivity of domestic ﬁrms6. There are various ways to rationalize this as-
sumption: ample empirical evidence documents the vast diﬀerences in total
factor productivity between industrialized and developing economies. Hall
and Jones (1999), for instance, show that total factor productivity (TFP)
in the average developing country is about 30 percent of TFP in the United
States. While it might be tempting to use this number to quantify the pro-
ductivity advantage of foreign ﬁrms, two caveats are in place. First, as shown
by Dreher et al. (2007), oﬃcial GDP ﬁgures neglect the shadow economy and
may therefore exaggerate productivity diﬀerences. Second, it is not plausible
that foreign ﬁrms’ TFP is not aﬀected by host-country conditions. Instead,
foreign ﬁrms’ productivity AF is likely to be a combination of source-country
TFP (A∗) and host-country TFP (AH), i.e. AF = θA∗ + (1 − θ)AH with
θ ∈ [0,1] depending on the extent of host-country technology spillovers.7
Another way to rationalize the productivity advantage of foreign ﬁrms is to
refer to the literature that explores the impact of foreign takeovers on ﬁrms’
wages (see, e.g. te Velde and Morrissey (2003), OECD (2008)). While the
documented wage jumps of up to 40 percent may be due to a changing skill
composition of employees, we interpret the empirical evidence as being sup-
portive to the general idea that foreign investors not only export capital but
also expertise. In our framework, this gives rise to a bi-sectoral structure
in which (low-productivity) domestic ﬁrms coexist with (high-productivity)
foreign ﬁrms.
The international capital market provides foreign investors with a com-
peting investment alternative which oﬀers an exogenous gross return R∗. This












where we have already used the fact that the sum of employment in the




6In what follows, we will use the superscript H to denote variables that refer to domestic
ﬁrms.
7Note that we abstract from the possibility that the presence of foreign ﬁrms raises
TFP of domestic ﬁrms (see, e.g., Haskel et al. (2007) and Bitzer and Kerekes (2008)).
7We assume that, once investment has taken place, labor moves freely be-
tween the foreign and the domestic sector. As a result, foreign and domestic
ﬁrms pay the same wage in equilibrium. Using this condition as well as (5)

















α > 1 (13)
reﬂects the productivity advantage of foreign ﬁrms. The expression in (12)
has a straightforward interpretation: in a bi-sectoral economy, domestic and
foreign ﬁrms compete for the labor force. In equilibrium, domestic ﬁrms
attract more workers the higher their capital stock relative to the foreign
ﬁrms’ capital stock ( KH
t+j/KF
t+j ), and the lower the productivity advantage
of foreign ﬁrms (Ω). While we postpone the discussion of expropriation risk to
the next section, we note that these eﬀects will later be crucial in determining
the relative gains and losses from expropriation for diﬀerent age groups.
Combining (11) and (12) yields the following relationship between the
capital stock in the foreign sector relative to the economy-wide labor supply
(¯ kF
t+j ≡ KF
t+j/Lt+j) and the capital stock in the domestic sector relative to
















Equation (14) documents that foreign investment in the economy under
consideration is low if international capital markets oﬀer a high interest rate
(R∗) and if foreign ﬁrms’ productivity in the host country (AF) is low8. A
high capital stock in the domestic sector (relative to the aggregate labor
force) further reduces foreign investment by lowering the eﬀective labor sup-
ply available to foreign ﬁrms. Conversely, FDI per worker increases in the
foreign ﬁrms’ productivity advantage (Ω). Of course, neither the foreign nor
the domestic capital stock can be negative.
Our goal is to derive the time path of ¯ kF
t+j with j = 1,2,... following the
elimination of investment barriers in period t. Since – as demonstrated by
(14) – foreign investment depends on the capital stock in the domestic sector,
8Note that, due to our assumption of a 100 percent depreciation rate, FDI in period
t + j coincides with the capital stock in period t + j + 1. We will therefore use the two
terms interchangeably.
8we start by considering domestic saving behavior and capital accumulation
in the open economy. Using the relationship KH
t+j+1 = Nt+jst+j, the savings
function in (7), the equilibrium factor rewards from (5) and (6) as well as


















(1 − α)(1 + n)
(2 + n)α(1 + n + β)
(16)












as the capital stock in the foreign sector relative to the capital stock in
the domestic sector. Note that (15) is identical to (8) – the law of motion for
capital in the closed-economy – if bt+j = bt+j+1 = 0. Moreover, bt = 0, i.e.
the domestic economy is in autarky through period t, and bt+j ≥ 0 for j ≥ 1.
We thus have to distinguish between the period that immediately follows the
elimination of investment barriers (t + 1) and subsequent periods (t + j + 1
with j ≥ 1). In addition, we have to take into account that neither ¯ kF
t+j nor
¯ kH
t+j must be negative. The following Lemma summarizes the behavior of
FDI per worker in the short and in the long run:
Lemma 1: Absent the risk of expropriation the time path of FDI per worker
is given by the following expressions:
I) Short run (period t + 1):
























































(1+n)Ω then ¯ kF

















for j = 2,3,....
iii) If
βR∗







for j = 2,3,....
Proof: See the Appendix.
Among the results stated by Lemma 1 the most important one is that
¯ kF
t+j reaches a constant (steady-state) level in period t + 2. This is due to
the essentially stationary nature of the model: with a constant population
growth rate in the host country and a constant world interest rate (R∗), there
is no reason why FDI per worker should vary over time after the adjustment
period t + 1. Whether steady-state FDI takes place at all depends on the
world interest rate (R∗) and the productivity advantage of foreign ﬁrms (Ω).
If R∗/Ω is very high, foreigners do not ﬁnd it advantageous to invest in the
domestic economy. Conversely, if this ratio is very low – indicating that the
domestic economy oﬀers high returns relative to world capital markets – FDI
may become so large that domestic residents decide not to save at all. In
this case, they rely on their old-age wage income and the domestic sector
essentially disappears. If R∗/Ω takes on an intermediate value, foreign and
domestic ﬁrms coexist in the steady state. The same mechanisms work for
period t+1. Whether FDI is zero or strictly positive in that period crucially
hinges on the capital-labor ratio in the autarky steady state as deﬁned by
(9): with a high value of λ, wages are high under autarky, domestic savings
are high, and after the removal of investment barriers foreign ﬁrms have to
compete with a large domestic sector. By contrast, the domestic sector is
small in case of a low λ and the economy is attractive for foreign investors.
While we have focused on the evolution of FDI per worker so far, a
more informative measure of capital inﬂows is FDI relative to GDP. We
can compute total GDP by adding the outputs of both sectors. Using the






















Deﬁning GDP per worker as ¯ yt+j ≡ Yt+j/Lt+j and using equations (12),
(13), (14) and (17) we can show that , for j ≥ 1, ¯ yt+j is constant, i.e.


























Lemma 2 describes how the population growth rate n aﬀects FDI – both
per worker and relative to GDP – in the short run and in the long run:
Lemma 2: In all periods t + j with j ≥ 1, the level of FDI per worker and
relative to GDP is non-decreasing in the population growth rate n.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The proof of Lemma 2 is based on (14) and (20) which state that FDI
per worker and relative to GDP decreases in the domestic capital stock. As
in autarky, the latter decreases in n – both due to the eﬀect of population
growth on the savings rate and due to the fact that, with a higher value of
n, a given capital stock is used by an ever increasing labor force. If domestic
agents completely abstain from saving the entire capital stock is provided
by foreign ﬁrms and its volume per worker and relative to domestic GDP is
unaﬀected by n.
3 Modeling Expropriation Risk
3.1 The Costs of Expropriation
We now capture the observation that insecure property rights are a major
impediment to foreign investments in developing countries by introducing
the possibility of expropriation into our model. Expropriation is discrimina-
tory – i.e. it targets foreign investors but leaves domestically-owned capital
untouched – and it is initiated by a government that seeks to maximize its
political support among domestic workers. Moreover, we assume that ex-
propriation is always complete – i.e. we exclude the possibility of a partial
expropriation – and that the capital returns of foreign ﬁrms are evenly dis-
tributed among the host country’s labour force.9
9Note that, due to our assumption of a 100-percent rate of depreciation, there is no
capital stock to be redistributed.
11Obviously, if expropriation were costless, the government would be sub-
ject to the well-known time-inconsistency problem: the promise not to harass
foreign ﬁrms would not be credible since there is a large temptation to expro-
priate these ﬁrms once their capital is installed. As a consequence, foreigners
would refrain from investing in the host country. The literature has come up
with various approaches to explain why international investments take place
despite these obvious risks: it has been argued that host country governments
refrain from expropriation for fear of not attracting further investments in
the future (see Cole and English (1991)) or because ’direct sanctions’ reduce
the net beneﬁts of expropriation. In this paper, we follow the approach of
Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) and argue that, in case of expropriation, foreign
investors withdraw their expertise. As a result, TFP in the foreign sector
drops from AF to AH. We believe that this is a highly plausible assump-
tion: foreign managers are unlikely to further operate ﬁrms whose proﬁts
entirely accrue to the host-country population. Moreover, by making this
assumption, we do not have to worry about the credibility issues that come
along with alternative sanctions suggested by the literature. In particular,
we do not have to claim that, after expropriation, foreign ﬁrms shun the host
country for a potentially inﬁnite time span.
To identify the costs and beneﬁts of expropriation for the host-country
population, we have to be precise on the sequence of events: most impor-
tantly, we assume that workers decide to work in the domestic or the foreign
sector after the expropriation decision but before production and consump-
tion take place. The fact that the productivity level in the foreign sector
decreases in case of expropriation has important consequences for wages and
capital returns: it directly follows from equation (12) that, in case of ex-
propriation, a higher portion of the labor force is available for the domestic
sector and that the economy-wide wage level drops.
We can thus decompose the aggregate beneﬁts and costs of expropriation
into three eﬀects: most directly, all domestic citizens beneﬁt from a strictly
positive transfer eﬀect since by the end of the period, capital returns in
the foreign sector are evenly distributed among the two active generations
currently alive. By contrast, old and young workers are hurt by a negative
wage eﬀect which is due to the lower productivity in the foreign sector and
the resulting decline in wages. Finally, capital-owners beneﬁt from a positive
return eﬀect: the larger labor supply in the domestic sector lowers wage costs
and boosts proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms. The fact that only old workers possess
capital while young workers exclusively rely on their labor income relates the
resulting distributional interests to the host country’s demographic structure.
123.2 The Government’s Expropriation Decision
In this subsection, we model the government’s expropriation decision in pe-
riod t + j with j ≥ 1 as a choice of the variable ξt+j with
ξt+j =
 
0 if no expropriation occurs in period t + j
1 if expropriation occurs in period t + j
(21)
The government’s goal is to maximize its political support among the
host-country’s working population. Political support in period t+j is denoted













t+j is deﬁned by equation (1). The parameter ρ captures the
notion that“political impact”may be a non-linear function of group-size: if,
for example, 0 < ρ < 1, raising the size of a generation increases its weight
in the government’s objective function, but at a decreasing rate. Conversely,
if ρ = 0, group size is irrelevant for a generation’s weight. We interpret a
lower volume of ρ as an indicator of a ”‘less democratic”’ political system.
Expropriation takes place in period t+ j if Wt+j(1) > Wt+j(0). Whether
this condition is satisﬁed depends on how expropriation aﬀects old workers’
consumption and young workers’ lifetime utility. Denoting the per-capita
transfer resulting from expropriation in period t+j by Φt+j with j = 1,2,...
and wages and domestic-sector returns to capital by wt+j and rH
t+j respec-
tively, we can use equations (2), (3), (7) and the fact that Φt+j adds to both
















1 + n + β
 


















Note that wages and capital returns in period t + j not only depend
on the domestic capital stock KH
t+j and the volume of foreign investment
13KF
t+j, but also on the total factor productivity in the foreign sector AF. The
latter equals the domestic sector’s productivity level AH if ξt+j = 1 and











t+j denotes the return to capital in the foreign sector in case of
expropriation.
3.3 Foreign Investment and the Incentive to
Expropriate
As stated above, expropriation takes place in period t + j if the diﬀer-
ence ∆Wt+j ≡ Wt+j(1) − Wt+j(0) is strictly positive. We deﬁne a non-
expropriation equilibrium as an equilibrium in which the government has no
incentive to expropriate given that agents expect it not to expropriate in the
future, and we derive the constrained volume of FDI relative to the domestic
labor force (¯ k
F,c
t+j) that supports such an equilibrium.
In what follows, the ratio bt+j = ¯ kF
t+j/¯ kH
t+j – i.e. the ratio of the capital
stock in the foreign sector relative to the capital stock in the domestic sector
at time t + j – will play an important role. To illustrate why, we show how
it enters the wage eﬀect, the return eﬀect and the relative transfer eﬀect of
expropriation. Using (12) and (5) it is easy to derive the wage in case of
expropriation (wE












This expression is smaller than one and decreases in bt+j since Ω > 1.
Hence, workers suﬀer from a declining wage in case of expropriation. The
damage done is especially big if there is a strong presence of foreign ﬁrms
and if these ﬁrms’ productivity advantage is high. Conversely, using (12)
and (6), we can show that capital returns in the domestic sector in case of
expropriation (r
H,E
t+j ) relative to non-expropriation (r
H,N













This expression is greater than one and increases in bt+j: capital owners
beneﬁt from expropriation since labor ﬂows back into the domestic sector.
14The resulting increase in returns is the stronger the higher the relative capital
stock of foreign ﬁrms and the higher these ﬁrms’ productivity advantage.





the productivity advantage vanishes in case of expropriation the wage-cum-
















which also depends on bt+j although the reaction of this term to changes
in the relative capital stock is ambiguous.
Equations (27) to (29) illustrate that, in every period, the eﬀects which
determine agents’ attitudes towards expropriation crucially hinge on the rela-
tive capital stock in the foreign sector bt+j. Note however, that it follows from
(23), (24) and (25) that both old workers’ old-age utility (ln(co
t+j)) and young
workers’ lifetime utility (U
y
t+j = (1 + n)ln(c
y
t+j) + β ln(co
t+j+1)) are not only
aﬀected by period-t+ j variables, but also depend on the past and expected
future time path of capital stocks and expropriation decisions. Nevertheless,
we can show that the host country government’s incentive to deviate from the
non-expropriation equilibrium at a given point in time (∆Wt+j) is a function
of bt+j alone. This is stated in the following Lemma:
Lemma 3: In period t+j with j = 1,2,..., the government’s incentive to de-
viate from a non-expropriation equilibrium only depends on bt+j ≡ ¯ kF
t+j/¯ kH
t+j,
i.e. the relationship between the capital stock in the foreign sector and the
capital stock in the domestic sector.
Proof: See the appendix.
The intuition behind this result runs as follows: in a non-expropriation
equilibrium, agents expect the government not to expropriate in period t +
j +1 even if expropriation has taken place in period t+j. As a consequence,
the returns on savings are not aﬀected by today’s expropriation decision, and
agents save a given share of their period-t+j income, possibly including the
proceeds from expropriation. Expropriation thus acts like a – potentially
negative – transfer which is spread over two periods and whose size depends
on bt+j.
The result stated in Lemma 3 considerably simpliﬁes the analysis since it
allows us to focus on ∆Wt+j as a function of a single variable bt+j. To sustain
a non-expropriation equilibrium in period t+j, ∆Wt+j ≤ 0 has to hold. This
allows for several possibilities: ∆Wt+j may be negative for any value of bt+j.
15In this case, the non-expropriation constraint is not binding and the economy
behaves as described in Section 2.3. Conversely, ∆Wt+j may be positive for
all positive values of bt+j. In this case, no FDI takes place in equilibrium
since the only value of bt+j that supports a non-expropriation equilibrium is
zero. Finally, the sign of ∆Wt+j may change as bt+j increases. If ∆Wt+j is
negative for low values of bt+j and positive for higher values, there is a strictly
positive value ˜ b which must not be exceeded to support a non-expropriation
equilibrium. Before establishing conditions under which the latter scenario





 ρ < (1 + n + αβ) α
1−α
This assumption deﬁnes an upper boundary on old workers’ relative weight
in the government’s objective function. The boundary decreases in the pop-
ulation growth rate and in the parameter ρ which determines whether the
function relating group size to political inﬂuence is convex (ρ > 1) or concave
(ρ < 1). The ﬁrst term on the right hand side magniﬁes the impact of young
workers’ utility losses from expropriation, i.e. if workers oppose expropria-
tion the strength of this eﬀect increases in (1 + n + αβ). Finally, the ratio
α/(1 − α) determines the relative strength of the wage and return eﬀects as
given by (27) and (28).
Lemma 4: If Assumption 1 is satisﬁed there exist strictly positive values
Ω′ and Ω′′ such that the volume of FDI which sustains a non-expropriation
equilibrium is
i) zero if Ω ≤ Ω′
ii) a ﬁnite multiple   b of the domestic capital stock if Ω′ < Ω < Ω′′.
If Ω ≥ Ω′′ the non-expropriation constraint is not binding and FDI evolves
as described in Lemma 1.
Proof: See the appendix.
The logic behind Lemma 4 is simple: The productivity advantage Ω de-
termines by how much wages drop and returns to capital increase in case of
expropriation. A higher value of this parameter thus raises both the costs
and the beneﬁts of expropriation. Assumption 1 guarantees that the cost
aspect of increasing Ω dominates for the government’s decision. If Ω is very
large, the workers’ income losses are high enough to prevent the host country
government from expropriation for any positive value of bt+j. Conversely, if
16the drop in productivity due to the withdrawal of foreign expertise is rather
low (i.e. Ω is close to one) the temptation to expropriate dominates for any
positive value of bt+j, and there is no FDI in equilibrium. Finally, if Ω takes
on an intermediate value, ∆Wt+j is ﬁrst negative then positive and equals
zero for bt+j =   b. In this case, the host country government refrains from
expropriating foreign ﬁrms as long as the capital stock in the foreign sector
relative to the capital stock in the domestic sector does not exceed a critical
threshold   b. Note, ﬁnally, that foreign ﬁrms’ productivity advantage can be
written as Ω ≡ [1+θ(A∗/AH−1)]1/α: it depends on country-speciﬁc TFP lev-
els (A∗,AH) but also on the extent of negative productivity spillovers (1−θ).
Hence, Ω may be low either because productivity diﬀerences between source
and host countries are small, or because the host country’s lower TFP drags
down the productivity of foreign ﬁrms.
3.4 The Evolution of Foreign Investment with Endoge-
nous Expropriation
In what follows we focus on the (interesting) case that   b is strictly positive
and ﬁnite – i.e. case ii) of Lemma 4 – and assume that bt+j =   b for j ≥ 1.
Hence, foreign investors exploit the potential for international investment,
but coordinate on not trespassing the critical boundary   b. The following
Lemma describes how (¯ k
F,c
t+j/¯ yt+j) evolves after period t:
Lemma 5: After the elimination of barriers to foreign investment in period t,
the constrained capital stock in the foreign sector relative to the host country
GDP (¯ k
F,c


























t+j/¯ yt+j increases over time and converges to a constant level ¯ kF,c/¯ y.
Proof: See the appendix
Lemma 5 suggests that, if the non-expropriation constraint is binding,
the time path of the economy-wide capital stock resembles the evolution of
the capital stock under autarky: instead of reaching the steady state after
a brief adjustment period – as described in section 2.3 – the volume of FDI
gradually increases over time, mirroring the evolution of the capital stock in
the domestic sector. The reason is that expropriation takes place if bt+j >   b.
Rational investors therefore avoid an excessively rapid growth of the capital
17stock in the foreign sector, adjusting their investment to the development of
the domestic sector. While the latter increases over time due to the gradual
inﬂow of foreign capital and the associated rise of wages and savings, growth
is much slower than in the case of secure property rights. Moreover, FDI rela-
tive to GDP eventually converges to a level which is smaller than what would
be obtained absent the risk of expropriation. This evolution is reminiscent
of the result in Barro et al. (1995) who demonstrate that, in the presence of
credit constraints, capital accumulation in an economy that is de-jure open
to international capital ﬂows resembles the dynamics of the closed-economy
neoclassical growth model. In their model, however, the incentive to ex-
propriate is taken as exogenous and a borrowing constraint results from the
inability to use human capital as collateral. In our setting, by contrast, inter-
national investment is constrained by the government’s endogenous incentive
to expropriate foreign ﬁrms.
To conclude this subsection, we compute the evolution of FDI relative to
GDP for the parameter values presented in Table 1:
Parameter Parameter value Source
α 0.4 Gollin (2002)
n 0.25 United Nations Population Division (2006)
β 0.8 Derived from setting R∗ = 1.06 per annum
AH/AF 0.4 Various sources (see text)
ρ 1 Assumption
Table 1: Benchmark parameter values
Most of these values are fairly standard. Setting α equal to 0.4 is consis-
tent with the results of Gollin (2002) who computes labor shares for a large
number of industrialized and developing economies. The population growth
rate is taken from the United Nations World Population Prospects (United
Nations Population Division (2006)): speciﬁcally, we compute 1 + n by di-
viding the number of children per woman by two. For the years 1990−2050,
n roughly equals 0.25 for the set of “less developed regions”. The value of
β is backed out by using (6), by computing the steady-state capital-labor
ratio that is compatible with an annual return of 6 percent in industrialized
countries, and by setting A = 1 and n = 0.1 when computing λ in (9). Based
on the reasoning in section 2.3 we chose the ratio
 
AF/AH 
to equal 2.5 –
i.e. eﬀective total factor in foreign ﬁrms is two and a half times as large as in
domestic ﬁrms. This number is clearly smaller than the TFP diﬀerences at
the national level that are reported by Hall and Jones (1999). Conversely, it
surpasses the wage increases that are reported as a result of foreign takeovers.
18Given the uncertainty about the exact size of the foreign productivity advan-
tage, we believe that our choice is an acceptable compromise. Finally, we
set ρ equal to one in the benchmark parameterization, thus assuming that
political inﬂuence is a linear function of group size.




















Figure 2: The constrained level of FDI relative to the host country’s GDP
Figure 2 describes the constrained level of FDI relative to the host coun-
try’s GDP for this choice of parameter values and illustrates the result stated
in Lemma 5: given the risk of expropriation, the FDI/GDP ratio does not
reach its steady state in period 2 but gradually converges to a steady state
level which is slightly above 2 percent of GDP. This value is much lower
than what would be realized in a world with secure property rights. It is,
however, not too diﬀerent from FDI ﬂows (relative to GDP) that the average
low-income country attracted in the recent past.10
Figure 3 illustrates the eﬀect of a variation of ρ on the constrained level
of FDI relative to GDP. A lower value of ρ raises the old generation’s relative
weight in the government’s objective function. As the old generation prefers
expropriation for any value of   b it is not surprising that the government’s
incentive to expropriate increases as ρ decreases and that the host country
receives a smaller volume of FDI relative to its GDP.
10Worldbank (2008) documents that, while FDI in low-income countries has picked up
recently, the cross-country average of FDI net inﬂows relative to GDP between 1991 and
2006 was 1.97 percent.



















































Figure 3: The eﬀect of ρ on the constrained level of FDI relative to GDP
3.5 Population Growth and the Risk of Expropriation
In the preceding section we have identiﬁed the constrained level of foreign in-
vestment per worker (¯ k
F,c
t+j) as the volume of FDI that keeps the host-country
government indiﬀerent between expropriation and non-expropriation. How
does the host country’s population growth rate inﬂuence ¯ k
F,c
t+j? We have
shown that a higher value of n spurs foreign capital inﬂows if we abstract
from expropriation risk since high population growth both reduces the host
country’s initial capital-labor ratio and raises the future supply of labor.
Once we explicitly account for the possibility of redistributive expropriation,
the role of n becomes more complex: on the one hand, we have to take
into account that a high population growth rate slows down domestic cap-
ital accumulation. The lower domestic capital stock potentially reinforces
the positive transfer and return eﬀects and dampens the wage eﬀect, thus
making expropriation more attractive for the government. If this “poverty
eﬀect”dominated the government’s decision a higher population growth rate
would reduce the constrained volume of FDI. On the other hand, raising n
increases the weight of the young generation in the government’s objective
function and thus raises the political costs of expropriation if ρ > 0. There
is thus a “political weight eﬀect” through which higher population growth
strengthens the position of those who oppose expropriation. Finally, there
is a simple“dilution eﬀect”through which higher population growth reduces
the per-capita transfer and thus reduces the attractiveness of expropriation.
20The multi-faceted role of n makes it impossible to derive general results
on how varying the population growth rate aﬀects the time path of foreign
investment. We therefore proceed by computing the constrained volume of
FDI relative to GDP for diﬀerent levels of n, using the parameter values
speciﬁed in Table 1. Figure 4 describes the evolution of ¯ k
F,c
t+j/¯ yt+j for n
= 0.2, 0.25 and 0.3. The shift of the curve indicates that FDI relative to
GDP increases in the population growth rate. Note, however, that this
eﬀect only materializes in the long run while the impact of varying n on
FDI in the ﬁrst periods after the elimination of investment barriers is close
to zero. Apparently, the “poverty eﬀect”, the “political weight eﬀect”, and
the “dilution eﬀect” of a higher population growth rate oﬀset each other in
period t + 1. This is intuitive: countries with a fast-growing population
accumulate little capital in autarky, and they enter the post-liberalization
period with a very small per-capita income. As a result, the constrained
volume of FDI is small even if young workers have a strong inﬂuence on the
government’s decision. In the medium and long run, however, the presence
of foreign capital and expertise results in higher wages, incomes and savings,
and domestic capital accumulation picks up. The “poverty eﬀect” gradually
becomes less important as wages and incomes increase, and the “political
weight eﬀect” of raising n eventually dominates. Note, however, that for
this development to materialize we need ρ to be suﬃciently high: if a larger
group size does not translate into greater political inﬂuence the “political
weight eﬀect”is suppressed by deﬁnition. In this case, no FDI takes place in
equilibrium, regardless of the population growth rate.
In the preceding paragraphs we have focused on the level and evolution
of constrained FDI relative to GDP and found that an increasing population
growth rate raises ¯ k
F,c
t+j/¯ yt+j. By how much does constrained FDI diﬀer from
the volume that would be observed under secure property rights, how does
this diﬀerence evolve over time, and how is it aﬀected – if at all – by popula-
tion growth? To answer these questions we deﬁne the“extent of expropriation
risk”(µt+j) as:







If the non-expropriation constraint is binding, ¯ k
F,c
t+j is smaller than ¯ kF
t+j,
and µt+j is smaller than one. Figure 5 demonstrates that, for our benchmark
parameter values, µt+j is substantial: due to the possibility of expropriation,
de-facto FDI inﬂows relative to GDP amount to less than ten percent of what
would be obtained with secure property rights. Note, however, that µt+j de-
creases over time: the inﬂow of foreign capital – albeit slowly – raises the


















































Figure 4: The eﬀect of n on the constrained level of FDI relative to GDP
domestic wage level. A higher wage level allows for higher savings, a greater
capital stock in the domestic sector, and still more FDI in subsequent pe-
riods. In the long run, however, diminishing returns to capital kick in, and
µt+j converges to a steady-state level of approximately 91 percent. Figure 5
also documents that while raising n has no discernible eﬀect on the extent
of expropriation risk in the short run, it reduces this wedge in the long run.
This mirrors the result illustrated by Figure 4: while countries with a high
population growth suﬀer from their low capital intensity in the periods im-
mediately following the elimination of investment barriers, domestic savings
slowly pick up as time passes, and the“political weight eﬀect”dominates the
“poverty eﬀect” of a high population growth rate. Note, again, that for this
eﬀect to materialize, group size has to be important in the political process.
Hence, in a non-democratic system with ρ = 0 a larger value of n has no
inﬂuence on the extent of expropriation risk.
4 Conclusions
There is a wide-spread presumption that shifting capital to countries with
high population growth rates might contribute to preventing an “asset-price
meltdown” in fast-aging industrialized countries. At the same time, those
countries that seem to oﬀer the highest scope for “demographic diversiﬁca-
tion” threaten foreign investors with bad institutions and insecure property



































Figure 5: The eﬀect of n on“Expropriation Risk”
rights. The goal of this paper was to augment an OLG model of a small
open economy with a support-maximizing government’s incentive to expro-
priate foreign investors, and to use this framework to analyze the impact of
population growth on FDI inﬂows.
We have shown that, in a world with secure property rights, higher pop-
ulation growth in developing countries does, indeed, foster international in-
vestment. However, if we allow for the possibility of expropriation, FDI is
potentially constrained by an upper boundary whose value is proportional to
the domestic capital stock. We have discussed how various eﬀects of expro-
priation – a transfer eﬀect, a return eﬀect and a wage eﬀect – inﬂuence this
boundary, and we have shown that although the constrained volume of FDI
increases over time, the wedge between unconstrained and constrained FDI
– the extent of“expropriation risk”– remains large. Finally, we have demon-
strated that, in the long run, expropriation risk drops if the host country’s
population growth rate increases. The logic behind this result runs as follows:
since young workers stand to lose from a withdrawal of foreign expertise they
oppose expropriation. If a relatively large size of this cohort also translates
into a greater weight in the government’s objective function, higher popula-
tion growth raises the political costs of expropriation. Conversely, if group
size does not matter in the political process the “political support eﬀect” is
suppressed and population growth does not aﬀect the risk of expropriation.
Our theoretical model thus provides us with a clear and testable hypothesis:
higher population growth should be associated with a lower risk of expro-
23priation – but only in countries in which the political regime is suﬃciently
democratic for group size to matter in the political process. While testing this
hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper, our results provide important
guidance on how to specify the appropriate empirical model.
From an economic-policy point of view, our analysis oﬀers some important
conclusions: ﬁrst, the interests of young workers and foreign investors are
aligned if the negative “wage eﬀect” of expropriation dominates the positive
“transfer eﬀect”. Whether this is the case depends on the relative productivity
advantage of foreign ﬁrms. In countries in which foreign ﬁrms’ productivity
is dragged down by an unfavorable business climate, high corruption etc.
or in which productivity gains are not passed on to domestic workers the
temptation to expropriate is much higher. Second, our analysis suggests that
a stabilizing role of population growth is conditional on a country’s political
institutions. It is the non-democratic nature of many developing countries’
political regimes – rather than poverty and population growth per se - which
gives rise to a bad investment climate. Accordingly, replacing established
gerontocracies by systems in which young workers have a stronger voice is
an important step in making countries more attractive to foreign investors.
Our third conclusion is based on the observation that, even in democratic
countries, the beneﬁcial inﬂuence of high population growth only materializes
in the medium and long run. This is due to the fact that, initially, a low
domestic capital stock raises the incentive to expropriate and drags down
foreign investment. As a consequence, it is important to design contractual
arrangements which provide initial institutional support to a ﬂow of foreign
investment which, eventually, becomes self-sustaining.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We derive the evolution of FDI per domestic worker for period t + 1 (the
short run) and all subsequent periods t + j + 1 with j ≥ 1 (the long run).
Combining (14) and (15) allows us to derive
¯ k
F















For period t + 1, we substitute ¯ kH
t = k as given by (9) into (31), taking
into account that bt = 0. This yields
24¯ k
F












To derive the level of foreign investment relative to the domestic labor

















for j ≥ 1. Note that this expression is constant over time: in period t+2,
the capital stock in the foreign sector (relative to the domestic labor force)
has reached its steady state ¯ kF. Analogously we can derive the time path of































which, again, is a constant value. The expressions in (32) and (33) are





t+j = 0, i.e. whenever the expressions in (34) and (35) are not
strictly positive.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From equation (14) we know, that FDI per worker (¯ kF
t+j) increases in n if
¯ kH
t+j decreases in n. We will therefore focus on the reaction of ¯ kH
t+j on n.
Using equations (34) and (35), it is easy to show that both ¯ kH
t+1 and ¯ kH
t+j+1
for j ≥ 1 are decreasing in n as long as they are positive. However if the
domestic capital stock per worker is already equal to zero, n doesn’t aﬀect
it’s volume and thus leaves the volume of FDI both per worker and as a share
of the host country’s GDP unchanged as well.
25A.3 Proof of Lemma 3










t+j(ξt+j = 1)) − ln(co
t+j(ξt+j = 0)) represents an




t+j(ξt+j = 1) −
U
y
t+j(ξt+j = 0) the respective young worker’s utility gain from expropriation.
To analyze this expression, we start by substituting the consumption
levels given by equations (23) – (25) into (36). Apparently, the capital-labor
ratio in the domestic sector (kH
t+j ≡ KH
t+j/LH
t+j) depends on the time path of
expropriation. Table 2 introduces some useful shorthand notation:










Table 2: Notation referring to the domestic sector’s capital intensity
Using (12) and the fact that productivity in the foreign sector drops in









with the foreign sector’s productivity advantage Ω and the foreign sector’s
relative capital stock bt+j deﬁned by (13) and (17), respectively. Note that
KF
t+j and KH
t+j are predetermined in period t + j. For a given value of bt+j,
diﬀerences between kNN
t+j and kNE
t+j thus only arise from the (endogenous)
reallocation of the labor force between the domestic and the foreign sector.


















Using the expressions for wages, capital returns and transfers in (5), (6)
as well as (26) we can show that an old worker’s beneﬁt from expropriation
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Using this deﬁnition and (37) as well as (39), we can write
∆U
y




















































It follows from domestic capital accumulation KH
t+j+1 = Nt+j · st+j, (5),

























1 + Λ(1 + Ωbt+j+1)
(46)
with Λ deﬁned by (16). Using (12) and (37), equations (45) and (46) can

































where f(bt+j) is deﬁned in (43). Expressions (47), (48) and (49) can be






















t+j) = 0 if bt+j = 0. Substituting (47), (48) and (49) into
(44) we can also show that ∆U
y
t+j only depends on bt+j:
∆U
y

















t+j(bt+j) ≤ 0. (52)
The level of bt+j where the government weakly prefers to refrain from








t+j(  b)) + ∆U
y
t+j(  b) = 0. (53)
28A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Since ∆lnco
t+j = 0 and ∆U
y
t+j = 0 for bt+j = 0 there is a trivial non-
expropriation equilibrium in which no FDI takes place. If ∆Wt+j > 0 for
all bt+j > 0 this is the only non-expropriation equilibrium. Conversely, if
∆Wt+j < 0 for all bt+j > 0 the non-expropriation constraint is not binding.
A non-expropriation equilibrium can be sustained by strictly positive values






















 ρ  












(1+n)(1+Λ)+βΛ. Note ﬁrst that the term in squared brackets
on the left hand side is larger than the term on the right hand side. By




 ρ 1 − α
α
< 1 + n + αβ +
βΛ(2 + n + αβ)
(1 + n)(1 + Λ)
(55)
Assumption 1 is suﬃcient for (55) to hold. Hence, by dividing both sides
in (54) by the term in squared brackets, we can establish the lower boundary
Ω′ which is greater than one and which Ω has to exceed for condition (1) to
be satisﬁed.















(1 − α)(1+n)ρ(1+n+βα). If Assumption 1 is satisﬁed,
the left-hand side (LHS) is an increasing and convex function in Ω with a
29zero intercept while the right-hand side (RHS) is a linear increasing function
in Ω with a positive intercept. There is thus one point of intersection at
which the LHS starts to be larger than the RHS. This establishes the upper
boundary Ω′′ which Ω must not exceed for condition 2 to be satisﬁed.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
After the elimination of barriers to foreign investment in period t, the con-



























This easily follows from setting bt+j = ˜ b in (15) and using the fact that
¯ k
F,c
t+j = ¯ kH
t+j · bt+j. It implies that ¯ k
F,c
t+j increases over time and converges to
a constant level ¯ kF,c. Using the production functions (4) and (10) as well as
(12) we can show that GDP per worker is given by:




















Using the fact that ¯ k
F,c
t+j = ¯ kH
t+j · bt+j and bt+j = ˜ b, (58) becomes
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1 + Ω˜ b
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(59)
















1 + Ω˜ b
 α (60)
Using equations (57) and (60) this ratio evolves as described in Lemma
5.
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